This paper empirically studies how social learning among consumers shapes …rms'optimal strategies of using advertising to signal product quality. I present an equilibrium model that describes both consumers' and …rms'learning and decision-making under quality uncertainty. My model allows me to distinguish between two roles of informative advertising -reaching consumers and signaling product quality. I apply the model to the U.S. motion picture theatrical market where advertising and social learning are two main factors for a new movie's success. The structural estimates imply that movie studios' signaling advertising only helps to reduce consumers' uncertainty by less than 10 percent. Word-of-mouth is a much more e¢ -cient learning channel for consumers, reducing their uncertainty by more than 90 percent. I also …nd that around 27 percent of advertising spending for movies in my sample is used for signaling product quality, while 73 percent is used for reaching consumers. Studios' tendency to advertise more during the pre-release rather than the post-release weeks is explained to a large extent by the signaling purpose.
Introduction
New product releases are often characterized by information asymmetry between …rms and consumers. Consumers are motivated to learn about product quality from all possible credible information sources in order to di¤erentiate high-quality products from low-quality products. On the other hand, …rms with high-quality products are also motivated to send "signals" about their product quality to in‡uence consumer learning. Advertising can be one of those quality signals which helps the market avoid the lemons problem. The so-called "money-burning"theory 1 of advertising (Nelson, 1974; Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) argues that the interaction of personal consumption experience and repeat purchases can create an asymmetry in the returns to advertising and, therefore, support the signaling equilibrium. However, for markets where repeat purchases by the same consumer are unlikely (e.g. entertainment or durable goods), social learning (i.e. word-of-mouth (WOM) communication among consumers) 2 , is more important for advertising signaling, especially when communication cost becomes su¢ ciently low due to new technologies.
Although it is well established in theory that advertising can be used as a signal of product quality, little empirical analysis has tested or measured this signaling e¤ect, especially in an equilibrium setting between consumers and …rms. In this paper, I empirically study how WOM communications among consumers supports the signaling e¤ect of advertising in the context of consumer learning through others'consumption experience. A structural equilibrium model is proposed to describe both consumers'and …rms'learning and decision-making under uncertainty about product quality. Then I apply the model to the U.S. motion picture theatrical market where advertising and social learning are two main factors for a new movie's success.
I contribute to the informative advertising literature by empirically distinguishing between the reaching e¤ect (with direct information) and the signaling e¤ect (with indirect information) of advertising. Before consumers decide whether or 1 In theory, "money burning" advertising means …rms "burn" money just to show they can a¤ord it and the advertising need not to have direct informative content. In my paper, it means studios spend extra money to show they are very con…dent about their movies' unobservable quality rather than only informing consumers about the existence and observable attributes of their movie.
2 Word-of-mouth (WOM) communication is one type of social learning among consumers. Social learning includes other types of learning, such as observational learning. In this paper, I mainly focus on WOM and use two terms interchangeably. not to purchase a new introduced product, they need to collect two types of information. First, consumers need to be aware of a new product coming as well as its observable attributes through advertisements; hence advertising plays its reaching role. More importantly however, consumers are motivated to learn about the product's unobserved quality. If consumers infer the product quality from the observed advertising strategies of the …rm, then the advertising plays its signaling role. On the other hand, when the …rm o¤ering the new product decides its optimal advertising spending, the …rm also needs to consider two roles of advertising: how many consumers the advertising can reach and to what extent its con…dence on the product can be shown through advertising. The reaching and signaling roles of advertising have been theoretically discussed in the literature that is related to informative advertising. However, to the best of my knowledge, my study is the …rst one that put these two roles of advertising into one framework to empirically separate and quantify them.
The intuition behind separately identifying these two roles of informative advertising is that consumers who enter the market at di¤erent time should have di¤erent information sources. For example, consumers who enter the market during the very early periods after a new product release are primarily in ‡uenced by the …rm-generated information (advertising), while consumers who enter the market later are in ‡uenced largely by social learning (WOM). Therefore, advertising in the pre-release stage has both a signaling e¤ect and a reaching e¤ect on demand, while advertising in the post-release stage mainly has a reaching e¤ect. The changes in the information structure and advertising spending over time help distinguish between these two informative e¤ects of advertising.
The data used for estimation comes from widely released movies from 2000 through 2005 in the U.S. theatrical market. This particular industry provides an ideal test-bed for several reasons. First, new products (movies) of uncertain quality (entertainment value) to consumers are introduced to the market every week which provides enough observations of similar circumstances for the empirical work. Second, studios routinely use marketing research to gauge the overall quality perceptions of their new movies prior to release (Turner and Emshwiller 1993, Wall Street Journal) , thereby producing an information asymmetry between studios and consumers. Third, in most industries, the ability to signal product quality can come through several channels, such as low introductory prices and product warranties. Since prices of movie tickets are the same regardless of movie quality, price signaling is ruled out. Fourth, both advertising and WOM play very important roles for information learning in this industry. Pre-release quality un-certainty and post-release social learning are the two main factors for studios to consider when making their advertising decisions.
Because it is infeasible to access complete and reliable data on studios and consumers'private information, I use a game-theoretic model to recover the unobserved information that is consistent with the observable data on consumers' choices and studios' actions. Instead of estimating the demand and the supply parameters separately, I estimate all structural parameters jointly. Since studios' optimal pre-release advertising policy function is an equilibrium result of the incomplete information game between studios and consumers, it cannot be written in an analytical format explicitly. Therefore, I use the Chebyshev approximation to approximate it. In addition, instead of maximizing the likelihood function directly, I take equilibrium outcomes of the model as constraints and use the MPEC (Mathematical Programming with Equilibrium Constraints) method of Su and Judd (2012) to simplify the estimation. The signi…cant advantage of the MPEC method over other methods, such as full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method, is that it does not require computations of the equilibrium to the model repeatedly during estimation.
The estimated advertising policy function, as an increasing function of unobserved quality conditional on observed characteristics of a movie, supports the existence of the signaling equilibrium. I estimate two speci…cations, one with consumers who infer quality information from advertising and another with consumers who do not. Comparing the maximized likelihood values, the …rst speci…cation is preferred, which demonstrates the existence of the signaling e¤ect of advertising in this industry. The estimated information parameters (prior variances and posterior variances of expected movie quality) from my model also show that studios usually do not learn about movies' true quality very precisely, and WOM is a much more e¢ cient channel for consumers to learn the true quality of a movie. In the post-release weeks, the uncertainty about a movie's quality is reduced by more than 90 percent mainly through the WOM channel.
After estimating the structural parameters, I conduct a set of counterfactual experiments to separately quantify the singling and reaching e¤ects of advertising. In the simulated cases, advertising is used only to reach consumers, without any signaling e¤ect, and the optimal advertising spending problems are solved for the studios in my sample. The simulated total advertising spending for all movies in my sample is around 9.5 billion U.S. dollars which is only 73 percent of the case when advertising is used for both signaling and reaching. This means that around 27 percent of advertising spending for movies in my sample is "burned"for quality signaling, while 73 percent of the advertising money is spent to reach consumers.
Using the same simulated results, I study studios'optimal strategies on allocating advertising spending over time. In the case when advertising is used only to reach consumers, on average, advertising money is arranged much more evenly over time, with around 50 percent spent in the pre-release stage and another 50 percent spent in the post-release stage. However, in the case where advertising plays both signaling and reaching roles, studios actually allocate around 76 percent of advertising money in the pre-release stage, in order to achieve the signaling purpose. The counterfactual experiments also show that information revealed by both advertising signaling and WOM even prevents movies with very low quality from entering the market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I review the literature most closely related to my work. In section 3, I brie ‡y describe the U.S. movie theater market and the data used in this empirical exercise. Section 4 lays out the model and de…nes the pure strategy Nash signaling equilibrium. Section 5 explains my empirical strategy, followed by a brief discussion of identi…cation. Section 6 presents the estimation results. Section 7 conducts the counterfactual experiments. Section 8 concludes the paper with some discussion about future work.
Related Literature
Since Nelson (1970) …rst made the important distinction between search goods and experience goods, the theoretical literature on informative advertising can be divided into two groups. The …rst focuses on how advertising conveys "hard" (direct) information about a product's existence and attributes (Butter, 1977; Grossman and Shapiro, 1984; Anderson and Renault, 2006) . The second group of papers focuses on how advertising conveys "soft" (indirect) information, from which consumers can correctly infer unobservable quality of products (Nelson, 1974; Kihlstrom and Riordan, 1984; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) .
While the theoretical framework of my model draws heavily from these two streams of informative advertising literature, I tailor the model with an empirical perspective. More importantly, in my model, advertising serves as a mechanism by which awareness is raised and product quality is signaled. Therefore, advertising spending is not simply a dissipative expense 3 . By separating the reaching role and signaling role of advertising, I can distinguish how much more money studios need to spend in order to get the signaling equilibrium. That extra money is called the "burned" money for signaling purpose in this paper. Following Hertzendorf (1993) , I also consider the possibility that consumers observe the monopolist's advertising expenditure with errors instead of observing the advertising spending directly. Compared to most theoretical papers that discuss the interaction of price and advertising in the signaling framework, I have the bene…t of being able to focus only on advertising because of the movie industry's uniform pricing feature.
Early empirical work about informative advertising mainly examines the relationship between price, quality and advertising. Studies that look for evidence of the signaling e¤ect of advertising mainly focus on detecting a positive relationship between advertising spending and product quality, so as to indirectly support the theory of signaling advertising. There are several main reasons direct tests of advertising's signaling e¤ect are di¢ cult. First, it is hard to tell whether advertising conveys hard information, soft information, or both. Second, other possible signals of quality, such as a low introductory price, may interact with advertising, complicating the analysis. Given the focus on correlation with quality, these studies must quantify quality measures, which is extremely problematic. They also su¤er from industry heterogeneity when using cross-industry data. Thomas, Shane, and Weiglet (1998) add to the literature by investigating data from the U.S. automobile industry. They …nd that car models that are priced higher than the full information price level tend to have greater advertising levels. Such positive relationships are weaker for older car models, about which consumers are already well informed. Therefore, they conclude that manufacturers use both price and advertising to signal the quality of their products. Horstmann and MacDonald (2003) provide a related analysis that focuses on the compact disc player market. By employing panel data, they avoid constructing a quality index, but instead examine whether the time-series behavior of price and advertising is consistent with the prediction of signaling advertising models. They …nd that the observed …rm advertising and pricing behavior is inconsistent with the predictions of signaling models of advertising. Erdem and Keane (1996) develop a structural model of household learning behavior in the laundry detergent market. In their model, consumers have imperfect information about a brand's attributes and learn through both consumption experience and advertising exposure. They provide a framework to analyze how the content of each advertising message provides noisy but "direct" 4 information 4 Here, "direct" signal means consumers learn directly from signals instead of infer from about brand attributes. Based on their 1996 paper, Erdem, Keane and Sun (2008) add price and advertising frequency/intensity as two more information sources for consumers. Both price and advertising intensity are assumed to be linear functions of brand quality, and consumers infer the quality of a brand from these two "indirect" signals. They …nd that advertising frequency does in ‡uence consumer learning, although it is less quantitatively important than price. Ackerberg (2001 Ackerberg ( , 2003 empirically studies consumer learning behavior in the retail yogurt market by allowing that advertising intensity has both "informative" and "persuasive" e¤ects 5 on demand. He …nds that, in this market, advertising is primarily used to inform consumers instead of persuading consumers. These four papers use very similar models to investigate how advertising in ‡u-ences demand, but from di¤erent perspectives. The …rst two papers focus on the informative e¤ect of advertising on demand, while the last two papers focus on distinguishing the informative and persuasive e¤ects of advertising. In contrast, my study considers both the demand and supply sides within one framework. I focus on how the interaction of advertising and WOM support the signaling role of advertising in an equilibrium setting. Two kinds of informative roles of advertising are separately modeled and empirically quanti…ed. Both Erdem, Keane and Sun (2008) and Ackerberg (2003) assume that advertisement intensity is a linear function of unobservable attributes and analyze how consumers infer attributes from observed advertisement intensity. In my analysis, advertisement intensity as a function of observable attributes and unobservable quality is solved as an equilibrium result.
In previous literature, consumers are generally assumed to know the existence and observable characteristics of a brand. Goeree (2008) relaxes this assumption by estimating a model of limited consumer information, where advertising in ‡uences the set of products from which consumers choose to purchase. She investigates the PC industry and …nds the estimated markup is much higher than predicted by full information models. She also …nds the estimated demand curve is less elastic than that in traditional models, because the market is less competitive when consumers are not fully informed. However, in her paper, there is no uncertainty about product attributes from consumers'perspective. In my model, advertising intensity is used both to inform consumers about the existence and observable attributes of a movie (reaching e¤ect), and to signal unobservable movie signals.
5 Persuasive e¤ect means advertising primarily a¤ects demand by changing consumer taste and creating brand loyalty. In those empirical studies, advertising spending is considered as part of the utility function.
quality (signaling e¤ect).
There is a growing literature within both the economics and marketing …elds on advertising and social learning using data from the movie industry. Basuroy, Desai, and Talukdar (2006) discuss the interaction of sequels and advertising expenditures as signals of movie quality using a reduced-form analysis. Elberse and Anand (2007) use data from the Hollywood Stock Exchange to study the impact of movie advertising on expected revenue. They …nd that advertising has a positive and statistically signi…cant impact on market-wide expectations prior to release, but this impact is smaller for lower-quality movies. My work explains the mechanism supporting this positive relationship. Santugini (2007) sets up a dynamic structural demand model to investigate how consumers learn about the quality of a movie by observing its market share during its opening week. I extend his work by allowing information about movie quality to be revealed by both market share (driven by advertising) and WOM. Moul (2007) and Moretti (2011) identify the impact of social learning on a movie's sales, without considering how social learning a¤ects the supply side's strategic choices of advertising. Joo (2009) considers studio advertising and consumer learning in an equilibrium setting. However, in her model, advertising a¤ects the consumer utility function directly, and studios are assumed to do all advertising before the movie's release. In my model, advertising a¤ects consumer information sets, and the observed large share of advertising expenditures in the pre-release stage is an endogenous choice.
Industry Background and Data
The theatrical motion picture industry has an economic importance in the global economy and U.S. economy. In 2013, the global box o¢ ce for all …lms released in each country around the world reached 35.9 billion U.S. dollars, and the U.S. (and Canada) box o¢ ce was around 10.9 billion U.S. dollars. More than two-thirds of the U.S./Canada population -or 228 million people -went to the movies at least once in 2013. The regular moviegoer segment (de…ned as the segment of the U.S. population who see at least 6 movies a year in cinemas) currently is 35 percent of the U.S. population (MPAA 2013) .
A movie can recoup its investment from both theatrical windows (both local and global theatrical markets) and nontheatrical windows (such as the home video market, pay television, network television, video games and merchandising). Among those numerous revenue windows, the theatrical box-o¢ ce revenue is believed to be the most important performance metric for distributors, since it is also an indicator of the movie's potential sales in other distribution windows.
Hollywood is a big spender on advertising. According to Nielson MonitorPlus, movie studios spent 3.7 billion U.S. dollars to buy advertising in the United States; movies ranked …fth in the nation among paid advertising categories in 2007. Advertising spending also constitutes a large share of a movie's budget. For example, in 2007 the average production budget for a theater-released movie from a major Hollywood studio reached 70.8 million dollars, and studios spent another 35.9 million dollars on marketing that movie to the public (www.mpaa.org).
New movies enter the theatrical market every week and exit the market after a few weeks. Due to the short life cycle of new movies and their uniqueness as typical experience products, the motion picture industry is characterized by information uncertainty problems. Both supply and demand sides are involved in active information learning to reduce their uncertainties about movie quality. One key risk studios need to manage is "performance risk"-how the market perceives and reacts to a new movie after its release. In recent years, sequel movies have become increasingly prevalent, which may re ‡ects studios'eagerness to emphasis on the well-established properties of movies to better manage performance risk. For the demand side, each movie is unique and the quality of a new movie is ex ante uncertain -consumers are unsure whether they will like the movie or not before they actually go to the theater and watch it. Therefore, they make their watching decision based on observable characteristics of the movie such as the director, actors, the genre and ratings. In addition, they also learn about the unobservable quality of the movie from di¤erent information sources such as "…rm-generated" information from movie studios and "consumer-generated"information from their peers.
Although it is very di¢ cult to accurately predict revenues and pro…ts of new movies, studios/distributors 6 often conduct formal market research for movies which are expected to screen in more than six hundred theaters. As a result, studios should generally have more information than consumers. Thorough market screenings and surveys are commonly used by studios; hence, it is hard to imagine that studios simply follow the "50 percent"rule of thumb 7 with their advertising budget. In my data sample, total advertising spending averages around 50 percent 6 In this paper, I use "studios"and "distributors"interchangeably. In practice, major studios do play the role of distributor, while independent distributors tend to …ll marget segments which are not covered by majors.
7 "50 percent" rule of thumb means a movie's advertising budget should be 50 percent of its production budget. If a movie costs 100 million dollar to make, the studio needs an additional 50 million dollar to sell it. of the production budget, but the ratio between these two varies widely across movies. It ranges from 1.5 percent to 875 percent, with a standard deviation of 65.5 percent. Figure 1 further shows that although the per-release advertising spending is highly correlated to the production budget, the post-release advertising has much lower correlation to that budget. Therefore, studios are making prudent decisions on advertising spending, and they respond to the market fairly quickly when critics and moviegoers disseminate feedback about movie quality. However, mistakes are to be expected. In the data, we observe that the size of an advertising spending does not always directly correlate with box o¢ ce revenue (BOR). For example, the total advertising spending for the movie "I Spy"released in 2002 was more than 45 million U.S. dollars, yet it only generated less than 34 million U.S. dollars BOR during its 12 weeks in theaters. After opening week, advertising decreases quickly over time, and WOM (social learning) among consumers becomes the main quality information source. With the emergence of social media such as Twitter and Facebook, social learning plays an increasingly important role in the movie industry. The impact of social learning is re ‡ected by the fact that sales trends for movies diverge over time after their release. One important question is how quickly social learning reveals movie quality to a potential consumer. For example, the sale decay patterns of "Bruno" and "District 9," which were released in the summer of 2009, diverged after their releases, but especially so from week one to week two. The weekly BOR of "District 9" dropped about 5 percent, from 37 million U.S. dollars to 35 million U.S. dollars, while the weekly BOR of "Bruno"dropped almost 33 percent, from 30 million dollars to less than 20 million dollars. Meanwhile, the IMDB rating is 8.0 of 10 (396,649 users) for "District 9"but 6.7 (94,848 users) for "Bruno" (www.imdb.com). This shows that the spread of information through social learning is fairly quick, immediately after opening week, and exerts a huge impact on a movie's later box o¢ ce performance. This leads me to create a simpli…ed twoperiod model to analyze consumer learning and …rms' optimal decisions about advertising, which helps to ease estimation computation while still capturing the main information features of this market.
The dataset used in this analysis covers movies that were widely released in U.S. theaters from 2000 through 2005. I include only movies that opened in more than 600 theaters and exclude "limited release" 8 ones, since widely-released movies are considered national releases and, as such, more likely to use mass media advertising. To control the information spillover e¤ect of movie sequels, I focus only on the …rst movie of a series. As a result, 632 out of 849 movies are included in the …nal sample and Table 1 provides detailed descriptive statistics of the main variables used for this analysis.
9 My data includes weekly advertising spending for each movie in my sample across media including broadcast, cable TV, newspapers, outdoor billboards, magazines, radio, and internet. To …t my simpli…ed two-period model of studios'optimal advertising spending decisions, I aggregate the advertising spending across media and divide the total theatrical advertising spending into two categories: prerelease and post-release advertising. Weekly BORs are aggregated into pre-release and post-release categories as well.
An interesting phenomenon in the U.S. theatrical movie market is the contrast between the allocation of advertising spending and BOR over time. In my sample, on average, about 75 percent of a movie's total advertising budget is spent in the pre-release stage, yet around 25 percent of a movie's BOR comes from opening week. An average of 15.7 million U.S. dollars was spent in the weeks before a movie's release and its opening week, compared to an average of 5 million U.S. dollars in the weeks thereafter. The average BOR from a movie's opening week is 14.1 million U.S. dollars, while the average BOR from weeks following opening week is 33.4 million U.S. dollars. This contrast between advertising spending and BOR raises questions about advertising's e¤ects on demand over time and how studios dynamically decide their advertising spending.
My dataset also includes several important observable characteristics of the movies, such as production budget, critic ratings, season indicators, runtime, Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) ratings, genres, distributors, and number of competitors. Since a large proportion of a movie's production budget covers salaries for stars, producers and directors, the cost of screenplay rights and cost of visual e¤ects, therefore, the production budget can be used as a proxy for star appeal, director appeal, story familiarity, and potential visual e¤ects of a movie. I use critic review rating from metacritic.com as a proxy to measure how critics in ‡uence moviegoers'watching decision. Two season indicators, holiday and summer, account for the seasonality of the movie industry. The holiday indicator equals to 1 if the movie is released around Thanksgiving and Christmas, and the summer indicator equals to 1 if the movie is released between Memorial Day and Labor Day.
MPAA rating and movie genre are two commonly used movie categorizations. There are four types of MPAA ratings including G, PG, PG-13, and R for movies in my sample.
10 About 18 percent of movies in the sample are rated as G or PG. About 49 percent of them are rated as PG-13 and 33 percent are rated as R. There are dozens of movie genres and sub-genres from which viewers can choose. However, several major genres make up the majority of popular movies. In my sample, most movies fall into those major genres for which I create …ve nonexclusive dummies: action, comedy, drama, family, and horror. About 40 percent of movies fall into the comedy genre, although they also can be categorized as both drama and action movies at the same time. I include distributor/studio dummies to capture the brand name e¤ect which is often emphasized in movie advertisements. Distributors are divided into major, mini-major, among others. Major distributors include Buena Vista, Fox, Miramax, Paramount, Sony, Warner Bros., and Universal. Mini-major distributors include DreamWorks, Lions Gate, and MGM. These distributors make marketing and distributing decisions for about 90 percent of the movies in the U.S. market. In this paper, I assume distributors of new movies play a competitive monopoly game; therefore, they make decisions for each movie independently without taking their rivals' reaction into account. Still, I include the number of other movies released widely in the same week to control for competitive e¤ects. In the sample, there are 2.32 other movies released in the same week, on average.
The Model
In this section, I set up a generalized model to focus on the equilibrium advertising strategy of the studio and the evolution of consumer belief. The model can be broken into …ve components: (1) model primitives, (2) the information structure of the market, (3) demand, (4) supply, and (5) the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. I will discuss each part in turn.
Primitives
Players There is a single studio with a new movie. The studio's payo¤ depends on the expected total BOR it can collect from the movie. To maximize its payo¤, the studio chooses its advertising spending, taking ticket price as given. Consumers learn about the arrival of a new movie through advertising and then make movie-watching decisions. The quality (entertainment value) of a new movie is not fully observable prior to consumption, so consumers make their consumption decision based on the expected quality of the movie.
Timing The introduction of a new movie is modeled as an extensive form game. Figure 3 shows the timing of the game. Time is divided into three periods.
Period 0 (After a movie is produced): a single studio produces a new movie j, with observable attributes x j and unobservable quality q j . Instead of knowing q j perfectly, the studio receives a noisy signal of its movie's quality, q js . Then the studio decides the optimal advertising spending for period 1 and period 2.
Period 1 (Pre-release weeks and opening week of a movie): The new movie is introduced to the market by advertising. After being informed by studio advertising, consumers update their beliefs about the movie's quality with new information and decide whether to watch the movie during opening week. At the end of period 1, some consumers may pass the information about the movie's quality to potential consumers for period 2. Also, the studio updates its belief about its own movie's quality and adjusts its advertising spending for period 2.
Period 2 (Post-release weeks of a movie): informed consumers receive WOM information, take it as a noisy signal of the movie's true quality, update their beliefs, and make their consumption decisions. Then the game ends. 
The information structure of the market
In this section, I discuss the information structure of the theatrical market for new movies in detail. More speci…cally, I will discuss the information learning processes of both supply and demand sides in this market, the roles advertising and WOM play during these learning processes and the interaction between advertising and WOM. When a new movie is released in the theater, it has both observed attributes and unobserved quality. Both the studio and consumers learn about the unobserved true quality of the movie through di¤erent information sources. I assume that the true unobserved quality of a new movie, q j , is a random draw from its population distribution e q iidN q; 2 q .
Information Learning: Studio
As discussed in section 3, the studio of a new movie can conduct various upfront assessments such as test screening and tracking surveys to learn about its movie's potential playability and marketability. Therefore, for the model, I assume that the movie studio receives a noisy signal, q js , of the movie's true quality q j in period 0. q js = q j + " js , with " js iidN (0; 2 s ), is known only by the studio. Here, 2 s measures how accurately the studio can learn about its movie's true quality through up-front assessments. I assume that the studio uses the information from q js to update its prior expectation of q j according to the Bayesian updating rule:
is the weight the studio puts on q js . E s j1 (q j ) is the weighted average of the prior expected value of q j and the noisy signal q js . When the signal is more accurate (with a smaller 2 s ), more weight should be put on the signal received by the studio. The perception variance by the studio for period 1 is given by
This equation suggests that the perceived variance by the studio is lower than the prior variance perceived by consumers, before any extra information available to consumers. Since distribution f (q js j q j ) satis…es the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) in q j , for any value q , Pr q j q j q 0 js (q j q j q js ) if q 0 js > q js . Intuitively, the better the received signal q js , both the probability that the movie has quality above a certain level and the value of E s j1 (q j ) will be higher. The studio then decides its optimal advertising spending a j1 according to its perceived movie quality E s j1 (q j ). After opening weekend, studios collect more information about their movies to adjust their advertising spending. For simplicity, I assume that the movie's true quality q j is revealed to the studio at the end of Period 1 and the studio adjusts its optimal advertising spending a j2 for period 2 according to q j .
Information Learning: Consumers
In this section, I discuss how advertising and WOM, as two main information channels, impact consumers'information learning in the movie theatrical market, and how these two information channels interact with each other.
The Role of Advertising On the demand side, consumers need to learn two types of information: …rst, consumers need to know there is a new movie coming as well as its observed attributes; second, more importantly, consumers are motivated to learn about the movie's unobserved quality. Both types of information can be carried by advertising. After the studio decides its advertising spending, advertisements are sent out as a series of messages, as seen on TV, in the theater or via mail. Consumers observe the advertisement intensity/frequency. When a consumer receives at least one advertisement, she is reached by the studio and knows that this new movie is coming to the theater. In this case, advertising impacts demand by providing direct information about the movie and plays its "reaching role". The consumer may also use advertisement intensity to infer the movie's quality and update her belief: the more advertisements this consumer receives, the better the movie is inferred by her in the separating Nash equilibrium. In this case, advertising indirectly shows the studio's con…dence on the movie and plays its "signaling role".
Suppose that, at the beginning of period 1, the optimal advertising spending the studio decides is a j1 , and then advertisements are sent out to consumers as a series of messages. A consumer can receive 0; 1; 2;
advertisements. Following Butters (1977) , I assume that the seller drops its advertisements at random into buyers' "mailboxes."
11 Therefore, the probability that consumer i receives k ij1 advertisements in period 1 is given by the binomial distribution which approaches the Poisson distribution. k ij1 is the realized advertisement intensity observed by consumer i from e k ij1 pois( a j1 ). Here, is the "reaching e¢ ciency"parameter which can be used to quantify how e¢ ciently advertisements can reach the market. I assume that consumers can be informed of the arrival of a new movie only by receiving advertisements 12 , so the probability that consumer i is informed about the new movie is
which is also the market coverage rate. In the post-release weeks, the studio adjusts its optimal advertising spending to a j2 , and additional advertisements are sent out to reach or remind more potential consumers. Consumers who are aware of the new movie comprise two groups: consumers who are informed by advertisements in period 1 and still remember the movie, and consumers who are reminded or just informed by advertisements in period 2. The proportion of the covered market or the probability that consumer i is aware of the new movie can be written as:
Here, describes how e¤ectively advertising money still works in period 2, therefore, (1 ) describes the depreciation rate of advertising stock because of consumers'memory loss over time.
Consumers fully learn from all available information and infer product quality through the studio's actions. In my model, advertising is not only used to inform consumers of the availability of a new movie, but also allowed to be used by consumers to infer the movie's quality. With the existence of a signaling equilibrium, the studio's advertising spending in period 1 a j1 = A 1 (q js ) is an increasing function of the received noisy signal, q js . Intuitively, when the studio receives a better signal q js , it spends more on advertising, and consumers tend to observe higher advertising intensity k ij1 . Therefore, a rational consumer should take k ij1 as a noisy signal of a j1 and update her belief about the movie's quality. According to the Bayesian updating rule, the posterior distribution and expectation of the true quality q j for consumer i in period 1 after observing advertisement density k ij1 are
The Role of WOM After opening week, some consumers who already watch the movie in period 1 may pass the information about the movie's true quality to potential consumers who enter the market in period 2. When consumer h talks to consumer i about the movie's quality, consumer i receives a WOM signal q ijw which is a random drawn from distribution iidN (q j ; 2 w ), where q j is the true quality of the movie and 2 w is the variance of the WOM signal. Consumer i may get several WOM signals and aggregate all information. Let d j1 be the number of tickets sold in period 1, which is also the movie's box o¢ ce performance during opening week.
is the average proportion of consumers who like to share their movie-watching experiences with the representative consumer i. Here, measures the information transmission speed, and the higher value of implies that more consumers like to spread information through WOM. Therefore, consumer i gets a sample mean of experience signals, q ijw , which is a random drawn from distribution
. The variance of q ijw is a decreasing function of d j1 , which simply means that if more consumers watch the movie in period 1, the average WOM signal, q ijw , is more accurate about the movie's true quality, q j .
Besides WOM signals, there is another information source about the movie's true quality available to consumers in period 2: the movie's box o¢ ce performance, d j1 , in period 1. With the existence of a signaling equilibrium, d j1 = D 1 (A 1 (q js )) should be an increasing function of q js and a rational consumer should infer q js from d j1 . Therefore consumer i may take these two information sources into account and updates her beliefs according to the Bayesian rule. The posterior distribution and expectation of the quality q j for consumer i in period 2 is
If consumer i infers q js from d j1 , then the prior expected q j for consumer
q , and equation (2) can be written as simple as
where
is the weight that consumer i put on the WOM signal q ijw . The perception variance by consumer i for period 2 is
Here, I discuss the intuition behind how advertising and WOM interact with each other and how the interaction between them supports the signaling role of advertising. On one hand, WOM between consumers in ‡uences the long-term return to advertising. Imagine that if a studio with a bad movie pretends to have a good one by spending a lot on advertising, then the WOM after opening week reveals the true quality and fewer consumers will choose to watch the movie in the post-release weeks. Therefore, a low-quality movie would not recover such an investment. This asymmetry in the returns to advertising created by WOM forces …rms to decide their advertising spending according to their movies'quality. As a result, advertising can be a credible quality signal.
On the other hand, advertising in ‡uences the WOM process as well. When studios decide their pre-release advertising spending, they need to understand that the pre-release advertising not only impacts how many people will watch the movie during opening week, but also it indirectly impacts how many people will talk about the movie thereafter. The more consumers are induced by advertising to watch the movie during opening week, the more WOM communications happen in the post-release weeks, revealing more accurate information for consumers. This mechanism further prevents the studios from aggressively advertising a movie if they think the movie is a bad one.
Demand
On the demand side, consumers make static discrete choices about whether to watch movie j after they are reached by advertising. Consumer i's expected utility from watching movie j in period t (t = 1; 2) is given by
Here, x j is composed of observed characteristics of movie j, such as genre, production budget, studio, the MPAA rating, the holiday indicator, etc., and is composed of consumer taste parameters. T D t is the time dummy which indicates whether it is period 2 or not and is the utility weight that consumer i attaches to
is the expected quality of movie j perceived by consumer i conditional on her information set, I i (t) in period t, and jt is the realized aggregate demand shock in period t from e jt iidN 0;
iidEV . Note the price of watching a movie in the theater is not included in the utility function, since it is the same for movies of di¤erent quality levels and stable during the sample period. Consumer i's utility from the outside option in week t is u i0t = " i0t , with mean utility normalized to zero and e " i0t iidEV .
Consumers are assumed to be myopic in the sense that they do not make decisions intertemporally. Therefore consumer i's watching decision in period 1 is described as:
and her watching decision in period 2 is described as:
Both equations (4) and (5) tell us that an informed consumer i will watch the movie j in period t only when
Then the probability that the informed consumer i chooses to watch the movie
, where jt = x j + T D t + jt is the "mean utility" for movie j. In period 1, the probability that consumer i chooses to watch the movie, conditional on observing
With advertising spending a j1 , the market share of movie j in period 1 is:
= ' 1 (a j1 ) 1 a j1 ; j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) = S 1 a j1 ; j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) and, with market size M , the number of tickets sold in period 1 is d j1 = s j1 M . In period 2, the probability that consumer i chooses to watch movie j, conditional on her being reached by advertisements, is given by
With advertising spending a j2 , the market share of movie j in period 2 is:
where [' 2 (a j1 ; a j2 ) s j1 ] is the proportion of potential consumers who are aware of the new movie but haven't watched the movie yet. From equation (6) and (7), we can tell that the market share of the new movie in each period is composed of two parts: the proportion of consumers who are reached by advertising and haven't watched the movie yet, and the proportion of consumers who are convinced to watch the movie.
Supply
The supply side is modeled as a monopolistic competition problem. Unlike other product markets, studios make decisions about optimal advertising spending instead of choosing an optimal price for a new movie. For each movie, the studio makes decisions independently, taking its rivals' actions as given. The studio chooses optimal advertising spending a jt in period t 1 for advertising campaigns in period t for t = 1; 2, based on its information about the movie's quality. I denote SV jt = E s jt (q j ) ; s2 q (t) ; x j ; j(t 1) ; a j(t 1) as the set of state variables that are relevant to the decision of the studio. The per period expected pro…t for the studio of movie j in period t = 1; 2 is
Then the value function for the studio is
where (1)) and q j jI (1) follows normal distribution with mean E s 1 (q j ) and variance s2 q (1). It should be noted that the studio explicitly takes into account the e¤ect of its advertising decision a j1 on the next period's expected mean quality E c ij2 (q j ) and variance c2 q (2) perceived by consumers through opening week market performance d j1 .
By solving above pro…t maximization problems, we have the optimal advertising spending for period 2 as a j2 = max ln M pE 2 j2 q j ; j2 ; d j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) a j1 ; 0
where E 2 j2 q j ; j2 ; d j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) = R j2 q j ; j2 ; d j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) d ( j2 ) = j2 (q j jd j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js )). The optimal advertising spending for period 1, a j1 = A 1 (q js ; x j ), satis…es the equilibrium condition
Here, I assume that studios maximize the total expected pro…t from the theatrical market by choosing the optimal advertising expenses, without considering the complexity of the vertical structure in this market. There are three key stages in the value chain in the theatrical movie market: production, distribution, and exhibition. Each stage involves di¤erent types of entities such as major studios, independent production companies, independent distributors, national exhibition chains and regional exhibitors. Vertically integrated major studios are often simultaneously engaged in both production and distribution, as well as interacting with exhibitors. In practice, movie studios pay the full expense for national marketing, but movie studios and exhibitors split the movie BOR according to the contractual arrangements between them. The general rule is that the distributor's share is high in the …rst few weeks, and declines as the movie's run proceeds (Vogel 2001) . Ideally, it is better to incorporate the optimal decisions of both distributors and exhibitors as well as considering the impact of the contractual agreements between them. However, I simplify the model by ignoring the contractual complexity between di¤erent entities for several reasons. First, the movie's box o¢ ce performance positively impacts the revenue from other nontheatrical windows. Second, distributors and exhibitors normally have a long-term relationship for many movies and have multiple negotiating points such as the length of the run in the theater and the number of screens the movie can be promised. Therefore it might be in the distributors'best interest to consider the exhibitors' interest when making advertising decisions. Third, the simpli…cation keeps the model tractable but still rich enough to investigate the questions of interest.
Advertising-Watching Equilibrium
Since this paper mainly investigates the empirical implications of how studios use advertising to manipulate sales in a learning environment, I will focus on discussing the existence of pure strategy separating Nash equilibrium of this incomplete information game in this section. In equilibrium, both demand and supply sides have rational expectation about each other's strategies and all expectations are consistent with the actual strategies.
De…nition 1
The rule A t ( ) and w it ( ) constitute an equilibrium provided each is a best response to the other. That is, (A t ( ) ; w it ( )) is an equilibrium if
To discuss the existence of a pure strategy Nash signaling equilibrium, we discuss the following lemmas …rst.
Lemma 2 If the advertising policy function A 1 (q js ; x j ) is increasing in q js , then
is increasing in k ij1 , and the best response rule is
where k ij1 is de…ned by j1 + E c ij1 [q j jI i (1)] + " ij1 = " i01 , and k ij1 is the smallest integral which is not smaller than k ij1 . Therefore the proportion of consumers convinced to watch movie j, 1 a j1 ; j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) , is an increasing function of a j1 conditional on x j .
Proof. Since e k ij1 pois( a j1 ) and the family of Poisson distributions satisfy MLRP, the posterior CDF of a j1 , H (a j1 jk ij1 ), is a decreasing function of k ij1 . Since A 1 ( ) is an increasing smooth function of q js , the posterior CDF of q j , G (q j jk ij1 ), is also a decreasing function in
q, so q j jk ij1 …rst-order stochastically dominates q j jk hj1 and E [q j jk ij1 ] > E [q j jk hj1 ]. Therefore Eu ij1 increases in k ij1 and 1 a j1 ; j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) is an increasing function of a j1 .
Lemma 3 Eu ij2 = j2 +E c ij2 q j j q ijw ; d j1 ; A 1 (q js ) +" ij2 is increasing in q ijw and j2 q j ; j2 ; d j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) is increasing in q j .
Proof. The above lemma only requires E c ij2 q j j q ijw ; d j1 ; A 1 (q js ) to be increasing in q ijw . The assumption that q ijw iidN q;
ensures this lemma holds.
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Assumption A1: s j1 is small enough. A1 means consumers have idiosyncratic preference shocks for the movie because of outside options, and the proportion of consumers who are informed by advertisements and choose to watch the movie in period 1 is small. Intuitively, this assumption means that a movie can not reply only on opening week to recoup its advertising investment. This should be a very reasonable assumption given the supporting evidence from the data. Table 2 shows that the market share 14 during opening week for movies in my data sample is 0.82 percent on average, with maximum value of 4.18 percent. The market share in the post-release weeks is around 2 percent on average, with maximum value being more than 15 percent. With the increasing impact of WOM on movies'box o¢ ce performance, one may argue that movie studios with low quality movies may strategically spend more on pre-release advertising. By focusing on opening week, these studios can recoup their investments before any negative WOM is generated. To show that it is not the case, I compare movies for which more than 95 percent of the advertising 13 As long as the family of distributions f q ijw j q j ; 2 w dj1 has MLRP in q j , then this lemma holds.
14 Market shares are box o¢ ce ticket sales of each movie divided by market size. The market size is the number of U.S. population reported by the Census Bureau in a given period. budget was used in the pre-release weeks to movies for which less than 60 percent of the advertising budget was used for the same period. From Table 2 , we can see that the …rst group of movies collects almost half of their total BOR from opening week on average, while the second group of movies mainly depends on the box o¢ ce performance during the post-release weeks. The average online critic rating and moviegoer rating for the …rst group of movies are much lower than those for the second group of movies. However, on average, the …rst group of movies can only recover around 63 percent of their advertising investment by collecting BOR. In contrast, the second group of movies collects 390 percent of their advertising spending through BOR on average. Therefore, it is not rational for movie studios to focus only on the short-run market by aggressively advertising pre-release while ignoring the negative impact of bad WOM on the long-run market.
Assumption A2:
j2( q j ; j2 ;d j1 ;x j ;A 1 (q js )) @d j1 @q j is nonnegative or limited negative. In period 2, consumers have two information sources from which to update their beliefs: the movie's market performance in period 1 and the WOM among consumers about the movie. d j1 is determined by the studio's advertising action and, therefore, can be called "…rm-generated"information. q ijw is determined by WOM communication among consumers and, therefore, can be called "consumergenerated" information. A2 implies that these two types of information are primarily complements, or, if they are substitutes, the ratio is small enough.
Lemma 4 If A 1 ( ) is a best response to w it ( ), then with assumptions A1 and A2, A 1 ( ) is nondecreasing, and, for q js 2 Q 0 S Q S 15 , A 1 ( ) is increasing.
Proof. In order to prove the result, we apply Theorem 2 in Athey (2002) . To verify that our model meets all the requirement of Theorem 2 in Athey (2002) , I rewrite the studio's revenue maximization problem in the following way:
0; a j1 0; a j2 0 15 Q s is the domain of random variable q js and Q 0 s is the subset of the domain of q js .
Theorem 2 in Athey (2002) requires that (a j1 ; q j ) satis…es SC2 in (a j1 ; q j ) and g (q j j q js ) is log-spm 16 as a minimal pair of su¢ cient conditions for A 1 (q js ) to be nondecreasing in q js . That g (q j j q js ) is log-spm can be met by the assumption that g (q j j q js ) has a conditional normal distribution and has MLRP in q js . By assuming (a j1 ; q j ) is C 2 , I just need to check the sign of
With assumptions A1 and A2, we know @ 2 (a j1 ;q j ) @a j1 @q j 0. Then by using Theorem 2 in Athey (2002), we know A 1 ( ) is nondecreasing. With assumption A2 and the assumption that f (q js j q j ) satis…es MLRP, A 1 ( ) cannot be constant for all q js 2 Q S , and therefore A 1 ( ) is increasing for q js 2 Q 0 S Q S .
De…nition 5 A pure strategy Nash signaling equilibrium is an equilibrium which satis…es (E1), (E2), and
where k ij1 is de…ned by
, and k ij1 is the smallest integral which is not smaller than k ij1 . Then 1 a j1 ; j1 ; x j ; A 1 (q js ) is an increasing function of a j1 .
(E4) A 1 (q js ) is nondecreasing in q js 2 S, and for q js 2 S 0 S, A 1 ( ) is increasing.
Estimation Strategy

Likelihood Contribution
From the data, I observe box o¢ ce performance and advertising spending in two periods for movie j: Y j = (s j1 ; s j2 ; a j1 ; a j2 ) 0 . From equations (6), (7), (8) and (9), we know that the observed variables Y j can be expressed as functions of unobserved random variables Z j = j1 ; j2 ; q js ; q j 0 in a more compact form. The relationship between Y j and Z j can be denoted as Y j = (Z j jx j ; ) which is also the BayesianNash equilibrium equation. So unobserved random variables can be written as If we assume that Z j = j1 ; j2 ; q js ; q j 0 M V N (U; ), where M V N stands for multivariate normal, then the pdf of Z j is given by
Then the concentrated log-likelihood function is
The maximum likelihood estimation problem is formulated as
and ML estimator is de…ned as
Estimation Method
To evaluate the likelihood function, I need to solve the advertising policy function a j1 = A 1 (q js ; x j ) as the equilibrium result of the incomplete information game between studios and consumers. In this paper, I assume movie studios of new movies make their advertising decisions in the context of a monopolistic competition game; therefore, they make decisions for each movie independently without taking their rivals'reaction into account explicitly. However, since the equilibrium advertising strategies for movies with all quality levels impact consumers, learning about movies' quality; studios need to consider the equilibrium strategies of all movie types to make their own advertising decisions. This requires computing the equilibrium strategies of all movie studios as the …xed points of the best response system, as well as solving each studio's pro…t maximization problem given that all studios play the equilibrium strategies. One option is to use the nested …xed-point (NFXP) algorithm proposed by Rust (1987) to solve the maximum likelihood problem de…ned in formula (10). The general idea about implementing the NFXP algorithm is that it involves two loops: in the outer-loop, search the structural parameter space over to
; ( )) ; in the inner-loop, for any given values of , solve the optimization problems of all agents and …nd all possible Bayesian-Nash equilibria. When there is more than one equilibrium existing, I need to evaluate the corresponding likelihood value for each equilibrium and choose the one which yields the highest likelihood value. The whole process continues until the outer loop converges. However, applying the NFXP algorithm to my model has some challenges. First, solving the model can be di¢ cult and even impossible for some guess of parameters , and …nding all possible equilibria for any guess of the structural parameters can be even more computationally di¢ cult. Second, the likelihood function as the objective function of the maximization problem can be potentially discontinuous, since for di¤erent guesses of , the number of possible equilibria can be di¤erent. And it is very hard to …nd a reliable and e¢ cient numerical method to solve optimization problems with discontinuous functions. Another estimation option is to use a two-step estimator (e.g. Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007)) which is computationally easier than NFXP. Two-step estimators do not require solving for equilibria, and instead estimate the equilibrium as nonparametric functions of data. Therefore, it reduces the cost of computation dramatically. However, the performance of two-step estimators su¤ers from the small sample bias problem in the …rst step and does not deal with unobservable variables easily.
In this paper, I apply a new constrained optimization approach proposed by Su and Judd (2012) , which is referred to as the mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) approach. The constrained optimization approach does not require repeatedly solving for an equilibrium or all the equilibria at each guess of structural parameters. Instead, equilibrium outcomes can be viewed as constraints that only need to hold at the optimum. The structural parameters and endogenous economic variables are chosen so as to maximize the likelihood of the data subject to the constraints that the endogenous economic variables are consistent with an equilibrium for the structural parameters. Thus, this approach reduces the computational burden of implementing the maximum-likelihood estimator. Su and Judd (2012) and Su (2014) provide more details about the constrained optimization approach and compare di¤erent approaches discussed here.
The maximum likelihood estimation problem presented in (10) can be reformulated as a constrained optimization problem in the joint space of structural parameters and economic equilibrium as the following:
where equilibrium equations Y = (Zjx; ) are written as constraints, and struc-tural parameters , unobservable variables Z, and Bayesian-Nash equilibrium ( ) are chosen to maximize the objective function. The di¢ culty of the MPEC method (and constrained optimization in general) depends more on convexity and sparsity than the number of unknown parameters. Therefore, instead of solving Z = 1 (Y jx; ) for each observation and each guess of , I choose optimal values for Z which both maximize the objective function and satisfy the equilibrium equation constraints to reduce computational burden. By solving the optimization problems of both demand and supply sides, I can derive the equilibrium equations Y = (Zjx; ) from the model. The number of tickets sold in both periods (equations (6), (7)) and the post-release advertising function (equation (8)) have closed-form expressions, but the pre-release advertising policy function a j1 = A 1 (q js ; x j ; ) cannot be written in an analytical format explicitly. However, the …rst-order condition with respect to a j1 presented in equation (9) can be used as the equilibrium condition which determines the pre-release advertising policy function of a studio in an environment described by the structural parameter vector . Determining the exact equilibrium advertising policy function requires solving the advertising …rst-order condition at an in…nite number of values of the private signal received by studios, q js , conditional on each observed value of x j . To reduce computational burden, instead of considering all possible values of (q js ; x j ), the studios'…rst-order conditions are solved at a subset of points in the support of (q js ; x j ) and the policy function is approximated using Chebyshev polynomials 17 .
Since consumers are assumed to be able to understand the signaling mechanism and infer q js from observed advertising intensity and market share, the equilibrium advertising policy function in ‡uences consumers' watching decisions through their utility function. Therefore, instead of approximating the advertising policy function, I approximate the inverse function, q js = Q (q js ; x j ), of a j1 = A (q js ; x j ). Further, all observed characteristics of a new movie included in x j enter the consumer's utility function as a linear combination, so they enter the advertising policy function in the same way in the equilibrium as well. I de…ne their linear combination as X j = x j , and the inverse advertising policy function becomes a function of two state variables, which reduces the computational burden dramatically. Let na be the order of Chebyshev polynomials for a j1 and nX be the order of Chebyshev polynomials for X j . The inverse advertising function q js = Q (a j1 ; X j ) :
where is an N 1 vector of approximation parameters, (a j1 ; X j ) is an N 1 vector of N Chebyshev polynomials and N = (na + 1) (nX + 1). a m ,x m are grids of ma na + 1 and mX nX + 1 Chebyshev nodes on a 1 ; a 1 X; X . With q js = b Q (a j1 ; X j ), the equilibrium equation (9) can be approximated by
Note that the pre-release advertising a j1 has two e¤ects: the …rst part of the equation shows the "reaching e¤ect" of advertising while the second part shows the "signaling e¤ect".
The maximum likelihood estimation problem formulated as a constrained optimization problem is presented as
s j2 = S 2 a j2 ; q j ; j2 ; a j1 ; d j1 ; x j ; ; b Q (a j1 ; X j ) f or j = 1; 2::::
Here, the structural parameters, , unobservables,
, and approximation parameters, , are chosen to maximize the likelihood function. Integrals over demand shocks in period 1, j1 , and true unobserved quality, q j , are approximated by using 20 draws from their distributions with antithetic acceleration. Integrals over demand shocks in period 2, j2 , and WOM signal q ijw are approximated by using Gauss-Hermite quadrature 18 with 4 points to improve the 18 Quadratures are used instead of simulation because they performs much better when compared with the results of simulation, and allowed for much faster execution. speed of estimation. The two-dimensional Chebyshev approximation used for the optimal advertising policy function has 4 degrees of Chebyshev polynomials for a j1 and 3 degrees for X j . Then the total number of approximation parameters to be estimated is 20. Equilibrium condition (11) 19 To increase the computational accuracy and reduce the estimation time,
I provide the …rst-order analytical derivatives for the objective function and the constraints, and I also provide the sparsity pattern of the constraint Jacobian.
Identi…cation
The dataset provides several sources of variation across movies and weeks to identify the structural parameters = nn ; ;
There are three types of parameters: demand preference parameters, n ; ;
information structure parameters,
2 w o , and advertising parameters (supply side parameters), f ; g. I will discuss each of their identi…cation in turn.
Since only data from one market (the U.S. domestic market) can be observed over time for each movie, preference parameters for observed characteristics, , are assumed to be the same for every consumer. This is equivalent to taking these parameters as ones for the average consumer. The variance in advertising spending a j1 and a j2 corresponding to the variance in x j can be used to identify . As mentioned before, I divide time into two periods: opening week and post-release weeks to make estimation easier. I aggregate the weekly box o¢ ce performance and advertising spending data for post-release weeks and use a time dummy variable to capture the demand's level di¤erence between period 1 and 2 due to the di¤erence in time duration. Conditional on a j1 , a j2 and x j , the level di¤erence between s j1 and s j2 across all movies can be used to identify the coe¢ cient for the time dummy . For aggregate demand shocks, the variance in s j1 conditional on x j and a j1 can be used to identify
, and the variance of s j2 conditional on s j1 , a j1 , x j , and a j2 can be used to identify 2 2 . The distribution parameters, q; 2 q , for the movie's unobserved quality, q j , can identi…ed by the mean and variance of a j2 conditional on x j ; a j1 and d j1 . The noisy signal variance 2 s can be identi…ed by the variance of a j1 conditional on a j2 after q; 2 q has become known. The adjusted WOM variance parameter 2 w can be identi…ed by the covariance of s j1 and s j2 conditional on a j1 and a j2 . Note that the information transmission speed parameter, , cannot be separately identi…ed from WOM variance 2 w , but assuming 2 w is a constant over time is reasonable. "Reach-e¢ ciency" parameter in the adverting reach function ' t ( ) can be identi…ed by the covariance of s j2 and a j2 conditional on 2 ( ). As a result, "advertising depreciation parameter" can be identi…ed by the covariance of s j2 and a j1 conditional on 2 ( ) when becomes known.
Empirical Results
Estimates
Advertising Policy Function The estimated inverse advertising policy function is presented in Figure 6 . For the constrained MLE estimation, no shape constraint is imposed on the advertising function, but only the …rst order conditions of studios'pro…t optimization problems are required to be satis…ed. Figure  6 shows that, conditional on observed quality (X), the unobserved quality signal q s is an increasing function of advertising spending a 1 for almost all values of X. Only when X's value is very close to its upper bound and a 1 is very close to its lower bound, q s is a "U"shape function of a 1 . However, in the data, movies with high X always have fairly high enough a 1 , which means the increasing advertising policy function can …t the data well. Since the estimated advertising policy function is increasing in q s conditional on X, advertising can play a signaling role if consumers are aware of the positive correlation between a 1 and q s . For the model estimated, consumers are assumed to be fully rational such that they understand the signaling mechanism and infer unobservable product quality from advertising. On the other hand, consumers may be naive, which means that they only learn about product existence and observable attributes through advertising. In this case, equation (1) becomes
and advertising is only used to reach consumers.
The model with naive consumers is estimated and the corresponding maximized likelihood is compared with the one from the original model. In a comparison of likelihood values, the original model is preferred, which supports the existence of advertising's signaling e¤ect.
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Utility Function Parameters The estimates of the preference parameter in the consumer's utility function is reported in Table 4 .1. Most of the coe¢ cients for observed characteristics are signi…cant and have the expected signs. In general, movies with higher budgets and higher critic reviews attract consumers more. More movies released widely in the same week makes it tougher for a particular movie to compete for consumers. It seems that consumers get higher utility when watching movies with longer runtime. Movies released by major distributors are much more preferred by consumers in general, compared with those released by mini-major distributors and others. An average consumer obtains more utility from movies with action and comedy elements and less from movies with horror element. Movies rated as PG and PG-13 by MPAA attract more consumers compared with those rated as G and R. It is not surprising that the coe¢ cient for the time dummy is signi…cantly positive considering the longer period of time in the post-release period. The coe¢ cients for the two season indicators, summer and holiday, are not signi…cant, which seems contradict the observed strong seasonality of the movie industry in the data. Einav (2007) decomposes the observed seasonal pattern of sales into two components: the underlying demand and seasonal variation in the quality of movies released. He …nds that the estimated seasonality in underlying demand is much smaller and slightly di¤erent from the observed seasonality of sales after controlling for the quality of movies. To some extent, my results are consistent with his arguments. Table 4 .2 presents the estimated parameters for information learning about a new movie's quality. The prior distribution for q has a mean of -0.317 and variance of 0.339. The interpretation of the prior distribution variance is that, before any information becomes available to either a studio or consumers to learn about a new movie's true unobserved quality, both parties face an uncertainty (measured by the relative standard deviation) of 187.8 percent of the systematic quality. The variance of the noisy signal, 2 s , measures how accurately studios can learn about a new movie's quality through marketing research before releasing it. The higher the value is, the less e¢ cient their marketing research is. The estimated 2 s of 3.501 means that studios'marketing research doesn't help them learn much about the movie's true unobserved quality. When a studio updates its belief about a new movie's unobserved quality, the weight it should put on the received noisy signal is Advertising Reaching Function Parameters Parameters for the advertising reach function are presented in Table 4 .3. With a of 0.131, the market coverage ranges from 8.55 percent to 99.6 percent for movies in our dataset. With an average of 15 million dollars in advertising spending during period 1, around 86 percent of the market is covered. This shows the advertising in this industry has high reaching e¢ ciency. However, the value of shows that consumers forget about the movie easily. The depreciation rate for the advertising stock (1 ) is 0.684, so only 31.6 percent of advertising spending in period 1 is still e¤ective in period 2. By that time, a great proportion of advertising spending is actually used to remind consumers about the movie, instead of reaching for new consumers. 
Model Fit
To examine the robustness of the estimated model, I conduct several goodnessof-…t tests to check how well the predicted data generated by the model …ts the observed data from my sample. More speci…cally, I am interested in how well the model predicts studios'advertising choices (both pre-release and post-release advertising expenses) and how well it predicts consumers'choices (the number of tickets sold both during opening week and the post-release weeks).
Based on the estimated parameters of the structural model, I simulate a large number of values for advertising spending and box o¢ ce performance over time for each movie in my sample. Then I partition the region in which each response variable of interest lies into 5 disjoint cells. By construction, the observed values of each response variable have a 20 percent probability of falling into each cell. In general, the test statistic is of the form:
where n o k is the number of observations that fall into cell k, and n e k is the number of observations that the model predicts should be in cell k. n e k = p k N where N is the observed sample size and p k is calculated by using the simulated data. The test statistic approximately follows a chi-square distribution with K 1 degrees of freedom, where K is the number of cells. . Table 5 -1 shows the observed and expected numbers of observations which fall into each cell for both advertising spending and box o¢ ce performance during the two periods. The null hypothesis of the formal test is that there is no di¤er-ence between the observed adverting spending (box o¢ ce performance) and the predicted advertising spending (box o¢ ce performance). The 10 percent level of signi…cance critical value of the chi-square distribution with 4 degree of freedom is 7.78. Therefore, in general, the model …ts the data well.
To further examine how well the estimated pre-release advertising policy function performs, I check how well the model predicts studios'pre-release advertising spending conditional on di¤erent values of observed attributes. I nonparametrically partition a 1 and X separately and form cross-product cells, where a 1 is the pre-release advertising spending and X = x is the linear combination of observable attributes of a movie. Then I calculate the chi-square statistic conditional on each cell of X. Table 5 -2 displays the …t of pre-release advertising conditional on di¤erent value ranges of X. Controlling the movie's observable attributes, the model does a good job of predicting pre-release advertising spending across cells. However, the model tends to …t the data less well when X's value is high. 
Counterfactual Analysis
The goal of the counterfactual experiments in this section is to understand how studios'advertising spending decisions are a¤ected by consumer information learning through di¤erent channels. Speci…cally, I try to 1) separate advertising's signaling e¤ect from its reaching e¤ect to understand how much lower advertising spending would be if advertising was only used to reach consumers, and 2) understand how studios' advertising spending allocation over time would be under di¤erent information structures.
The setups in equations (6) and (7) show that advertising a¤ects demand through two channels: how extensively advertisements reach consumers and how consumers take advertising intensity as quality signals. Ideally, we can consider a world where consumers automatically have the same information about a new movie's quality as consumers in the estimated model, without inferring from ad-vertisement intensity (in period 1) or market performance (in period 2). In that case, studios only use advertising to reach consumers, not to signal movie quality. However, in the estimated model, consumers only observe advertising intensity in period 1, and that brings some noisiness to consumer learning and also makes the simulation exercise di¢ cult. Alternatively, we can consider a world where consumers who are reached by advertisements automatically know q s as well as studios when making a decision and do not need to infer any information about q s from advertisement intensity (in period 1) or market performance (in period 2). Likewise, we can consider a world with naive consumers who do not infer any information about q s from advertisement intensity or market performance and make decisions only with their prior expectation. In both cases, there is no learning from studios'actions, eliminating the need for signaling e¤ect of advertising. The fact that consumers are either perfectly informed or uninformed makes the ideal case fall somewhere in between. The di¤erences in advertising strategies and spending between these two cases, compared with the actual advertising strategies and spending, give us an idea about the amount of advertising money that is spent for signaling and reaching purposes separately, as well as how studios' optimal advertising strategies are a¤ected by the information structure of this industry.
Experiment 1 (Exp1):
No information asymmetry about q s and therefore no advertising signaling needed.
In the estimated model, only the studio receives q js before the release of its new movie j, however, after the release of the movie, consumers fully accept and analyze all available information implied by the studio's actions and infer the movie's quality through them. Therefore, consumer i's perceived expected quality of movie j is
for period 1 and
for period 2. Both of them are a¤ected by advertising spending a j1 through its signaling e¤ect. The demand in period 1, d j1 = ' 1 (a j1 ) 1 (a j1 ; ) M , shows that a j1 a¤ects demand both through the reaching (' 1 (a j1 )) and signaling ( 1 (a j1 ; )) channels. For counterfactual Experiment 1, I assume consumers automatically know q js as well as the studio after the movie is released. Therefore, consumer i's perceived expected quality of movie j becomes
in period 1 and
in period 2. Both are independent of studios'advertising spending and the equilibrium advertising strategies. The demand in period 1 becomes d j1 = ' 1 (a j1 ) 1 ( ) M , and a j1 a¤ects the demand only through reaching channel (' 1 (a j1 )).
Experiment 2 (Exp2):
There is information asymmetry about q s , but consumers are naive towards information learning.
For this experiment, I assume that consumers don't know q js but the studio does, and consumers do not infer the movie's quality information from the received advertising intensity or market performance. Therefore, consumer i's perceived expected quality of movie j becomes Note: All advertising spending is in billions, and all numbers are calculated based on the target sample.
The results of these two experiments are reported in Table 6 and Figure 7 . For all 632 movies in my sample, the total advertising spending for both pre-release and post-release stages is around 13 billion U.S. dollars. For both simulated cases, when advertising is only used to reach consumers, the total advertising spending is around 9.5 billion U.S. dollars, only 73 percent of the original case. Therefore, after teasing out the reaching e¤ect of advertising, we see that around 27 percent of all the advertising money for movies in my sample is "burned"for the signaling purpose. If we examine how studios allocate advertising money over time, it is very di¤erent for the original case and for the simulated cases. When advertising plays both signaling and reaching roles, on average, about 76 percent of the total advertising budget is spent in the pre-release stage. When advertising is only used for reaching consumers, on average, advertising money is arranged much more evenly over time, with roughly 50 percent spent in the pre-release stage and another 50 percent spent in the post-release stage. In Table 6 , the advertising spending pattern is very similar for Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. This is because that only the average advertising spending over all movies in my sample is shown in Table 6 . For movies with di¤erent characteristics (observed and unobserved), studios'advertising strategies are very di¤erent under these two di¤erent information structures. In Figure 7 , I simulate advertising strategies for all three cases with di¤erent values of q s and X.
Conditional on X, movies with high q s have higher pre-release advertising spending and lower ex-ante expected post-release advertising spending in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. Movies with low q s have lower pre-release advertising spending and higher ex-ante expected post-release advertising spending in Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. Intuitively, when consumers have full information about q s , studios with high q s movies would like to spend more in the pre-release stage, since consumers understand they have high q s and more consumers tend to watch the movie once they are reached by advertisements. When consumers have no information about q s , studios with low q s movies want to spend more in the pre-release stage, since consumers can not di¤erentiate their movies from movies with high q s during opening week. In this way, studios with low q s movies can recoup as much of their investment as possible before consumers realize the low quality of their movies later after learning through WOM. When the X value is low enough, full information about q s even prevents movies with very low q s from entering the market. If we take Experiment 1 as the "full information" case and Experiment 2 as the "no information"case, then the estimated case can be taken as a "signaling" case, which reduces the information asymmetry between studios and consumers through advertising signals.
Conclusion and Future Work
For experience goods where information asymmetry exists between …rms and consumers, the interaction between advertising and WOM communication among consumers has not been fully explored. This paper models movie studios' optimal advertising strategies and consumer information learning in an equilibrium setting in the motion picture industry of the United States. In my model, advertising conveys direct information about a movie's existence and attributes in addition to signaling its quality. The WOM mechanism is used to constrain studios'behavior and ful…lls the signaling role of advertising. I use weekly data from the U.S. movie theatrical market to empirically test and measure the signaling e¤ect of advertising. By distinguishing between two types of informative advertising e¤ects, I …nd that around 27 percent of advertising spending on the movies in my sample is "burned"for a signaling purpose, while 73 percent of advertising money is spent to reach consumers.
Studios' advertising strategies over time di¤er when advertising is used only to reach consumers, with around 50 percent spent in the pre-release stage. When studios need to use advertising to signal movie quality, they allocate 76 percent of money for pre-release advertising on average. I also try to quantify how much value the "money-burning" advertising can produce, in terms of reducing information uncertainty faced by consumers, by scrutinizing movies of varying quality levels.
The estimated information parameters (prior-and-post variances of expected movie quality) from my model also show that studios usually fail to learn e¤ectively about their movies'true quality, while WOM reveals the true quality of a movie to consumers more e¢ ciently. In the post-release weeks, the uncertainty about a movie's quality is greatly reduced by more than 90 percent, mainly through the WOM channel.
In this paper, I use a simpli…ed two-period model to capture the change of information structure before and after a movie is released. One possible extension of this study is to consider the impact of revenue from nontheatrical markets on studios'optimal advertising decisions during the theatrical window. In this paper, I assume that studios aim to run the U.S. theatrical release window in a standalone pro…table manner. However, nontheatrical markets, especially the home video market, have emerged as very pro…table ones, and studios may consider the theatrical market as an advertisement for the nontheatrical markets. Therefore, the alternative assumption is the studios optimize advertising spending across multiple release windows. Besides, I propose a new method to model how advertising reaches consumers and simultaneously signals product quality, which can be generalized to other industries.
